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The equitable remedy of a receiver is an exceedingly use-
ful, and quite a necessary remedy in any period of active and
extended business operations. It may reasonably be expected
to be found developed to a greater or less degree of perfec-
tion and convenience where er and whenever such activity and
growth of business are to be found.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the Romans of long
ago, having been a progressive and industrial people, found
it necessary to have in connection with the great mass of
business, and their relations with one another, a remedy
similar to that of a receiver.
They therefore gave to their Praetors the extraordinary
jurisdiction to appoint "persons in the nature of receivers".1
This is probably the earliest mention of anything analogous
to this most valuable, yet severe remedy that is to be
found in the reports.
While in England though it is somethat difficult to
determine the exact, or even an approximate date of the first
use of this peculiar remedy, yet it seems safe to say that
it was not extensively used in that country much before the
reign of Elizabeth. (1558-1603)
However during the reign of Elizabeth, the appointment
of sequestrators and receivers of rents and profits became
(I) Spences Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol. I,p .673 ,n(f) .
2very common. And as little or ftothing is said, or is to be
found concerning this remedy or its use prior to that time,
we may naturally conclude that that is about the origin or
beginning of the law of receivers, as we find it set forth
in the law of the present time.
One of the first reported English cases on receivers,
is the case of Jordan v. Armes, 1 where certain property was
sequestered"into the hands of the Chamberlain of London and
one of the Aldermen pending the trial of the right of law, "
and a receiver of real and personal property was appointed on
May 20, 1588,2 and again in 1590 a case is reported, where an
order was given to show cause why a receiver, of a moiety of
the rents and profits of a theatre, should not be appointed
at the plaintiff's request.
The power of the Court of Chancery in England to appoint
receivers, has very frequently been called into action since
that time ; and all the leading principles in relation to
it, may be said to have been well established there long be"
fore our Revolution ; and it was then and has ever since been
considered as a power of as great utility as any of those be-
longing to the Court of Chancery. It is one of the oldest
remedies in the Court of Chancery, and is founded on the in"
adequacy of the remedy to be obtained on the law side of the
(1) Reg. Lib. 5 P. & M. fol.48.
(2) Spences Equitable Jurisdiction, Vol.I,p.6?3,n (f).
3court.
During recent years the subject of receivers has come to
be one of very great importance, both in this country-and in
England. This increased importance may be said to be largely
due to the recent extended application of this remedy to the
winding up of corporations, and especially railroad corpora-
tions. The vast importance of the subject may be more
clearly comprehended by knowing that from'the year 1875 to the
year 1887, no less than (392) three hundred and ninety-two
railways, having a capital stock and bonded indebtedness of
more than *twenty-three hundred and ten millions of dollars,
and representing nearly (40,000) forty thousand miles of road
have been sold in the United States under foreclosure proceed-
ings. In the aggregate the interests of many thousands of peiz
song were affected, and from one to nearly a dozen receiver-
ships were involved in each case of these foreclosures.
This remedy is purely an; equitable remedy and cannot
therefore be obtained on the law side of the court. Pomeroy
puts this remedy, under his classification, in what he styles
the first class. His reason for assigning it to this class
is, that the remedy of a receiver is 'entirely a provisional
or ancillary• remedy. It may be said to affect the nature of
primary rights neither directly nor indirectly, but is only
the method or means of the more efficiently preserving and
protecting these primary rights, or of enforcing them in
judi cial proceedings.Il
(1) Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,Vol.I ,sec.171.
4A receiver is not the remedy, but only the method or means to
an end. He may be said to be analogous to a sheriff in other
cases.
A receiver is an indifferent person between the parties
to a cause, appointed by the court to receive and preserve
the property or fund in litigation pendente lite, when it
does not seem reasonable to the court that either party
should hold it. 1  He represents neither party to the ac-
tion but is regarded as an officer of the court, and all that
he may do is for the benefit of all parties in interest.
Being an officer of the court, all property or funds entrusted
to his care are considered as being in custodia le is, and
such funds or property will be turned over to whoever eventual
ly establishes title thereto.
Every kind of property of such a nature, that if legal it
might be taken in execution, may if equitable, be put into
the possession of a receiver ; and hence the appointment has
been said to be an equitable execution. All statutes for
the appointment of receivers must be strictly construed.
TThe causes for the appointment of a receiver are numer-
ous, either to prevent fraud ; to save the subject of litiga-
tion from material injury ; or to rescue it from inevitable
destruction. The power given to an equity court to grant a
receiver pendente lite is regarded as one of the highest na-
Lure, and will not be used in cases where it would produce
(1) High on Receivers, sec.l.
5serious injustice, or injure private rights.
The duty of appointing a receiver is one of great delica-
cy and responsibility, and is discharged by the court only
with the greatest caution, and only under such extraordinary
circumstances as demand summary relief. The measure is a
peremptory. one and has the effect of temporarily depriving
the defendant in possession of his property, before the court
finally determines the rights of the parties in a decree or
final judgment. Such an interference with the rights of a
citizen, before a regular hearing and without the verdict of
a Jury, might be considered as a very grievous offence, and
'in contravention of the Constitution of the United States
unless it was clearly exercised to prevent a manifest injury
or wrong, or unless it be the only way of saving the plaint-
iff from irreparable loss.
A receiver appointed to preserve the fund or property
pendente lite and for its ultimate disposal according to the
rights or priorities of the parties entitled, such remedy
instead of being looked upon as an attachment of the property,
is regarded as being in the nature of a sequestration, and the
person at whose instance the appointiient is made, gains no ad-
vantage or priority over the other parties in interest. 1
Generally the object and purpose of appointing a receiver
pedne lite is that of a provisional remedy ; as an aid or
adjunct to the principal relief sought, and not necessarily
(I) Beverley v.Brooke, 4 Grat. 187.
6the ultimate object of the action. The appointment of a re-
ceiver pendente lite is to a great extent a matter resting
in the judicial discretion of the court to which the applica-
tion was made, unless the power is conferred by an enabling
statute, and is governmd by considering all the circumstances
of the case.
As to the appointment of a receiver pendent lite over
the mortgaged: premises in a mortgage foreclosure suit against
a natural person, it has long been well established that a
court of equity has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver over
such mortgaged premises, for the purpose of protecting the
mortgagee, and in aid of actions for the foreclosure of
mortgages.
But where adequate relief may be obtained by any other
remedy or where such a proceeding is not deemed imperative
by the court, this remedy or relief will not be granted.
And when the court deems such remedy necessaryeit will always
act with the utmost caution in appointing a receiver.
Mr. High states a rule in general terms as follows :--
"that in actions for the foreclosure of mortgages equity will
not interfere by the appointment of a receiver, unless it is
clearly shown that the security is inadequate", and that the
mortgagor or other person primarily liable for the debt is
insolvent and unable to make good any deficiency, "or that
there is imminent danger of waste, destruction, or removal of
the property from the jurisdiction of the court". 1
(1) High on Receivers.
7The court will not as a matter of course interfere by ap-
pointing a receiver in aid of foreclosure proceedings, first
if the plaintiff fails to allege that there will be a deficieri.
cy, and if he is at liberty to obtain a decree of sale ; for
this alone would be an adequate remedy and an equity court
will not grant a receiver when any other adequate remedy ex-
ists. Second, where the mortgagor holds the legal title and
is entitled to possession, the court will not appoint a receiv-
er and disturb such possession, except in a clear case of
fraud on the part of the mortgagor, or where the mortgagee's
rights would be in great danger if a receiver was not ap-
pointed. Third, the court will not interfere with such pos-
session of the mortgagor, if there is existing doubt as to
the amount actually due under the mortgage, or if the defend-
ant's answer denies the plaintiff's allegations of inadequacy
of security.
The English doctrine makes a distinction between legal
and equitable mortgages, in the appointment of receivers.
Now since an equitable mortgage gives only an equitable inter-
est and not a legal title, a receiver will be granted in be-
half of an equitable mortgagee, when it would not be granted
if such mortgagee had been a legal one. This is true for
the reason that the legal mortgagee has other adequate reme-
dies while the equitable mortgagee is without such remedy.
Lord Eldon's reason for this difference was that inasmuch
as the legal mortgagee was entitled to immediate possession,
8and could himself at once take possession and protect his
interests, he therefore stood in no need of the aid of equity.
Where there are several mortgages all subsequent to the first
mortgage, the subsequent mortgages are regarded as equitable
mortgages. The English doctrine has not been generally fol-
lowed in this country, though it has been recognized.
But while under the English doctrine a.. receiver will not
usually be appointed in behalf of the legal mortgagee, yet
even under this rule.. if the legal mortgagee is unable to take
possession, the reason for the rule has failed and he may have
a receiver appointed in such a case.1
In Michigan it is provided by statute that the mortgagor
is absolutely entitled to possession and no receiver will be
appointed until the foreclosure becomes absolute.
The general rule as to rents and profits of a mortgaged
premises pending a litigation is, that "in the absence of any
especial equities, the mortgagee, as against the mortgagor in
possession and those deriving title under him subsequent to
the mortgage, is not entitled to a receiver of the rents and
profits pendente lite, and a court of equity will usually
leave the mortgagee to his action at law to recover possession
I
for the rents and profits".2
A receiver pendent lite will not be appointed to collect
and care for the rents and profits, where the mortgaged premi-
ses are an adequate security for the payment of the indebted-
(1) Ackland v.Gravener, 31 Beav.484.
(2) High on Receivers, sec. 642.
9ness, or when the mortgage indebtedness is not yet due.
But if the mortgagee obtains a receiver of the rents and
profits, upon foreclosure proceedings and the amount received
upon the sale of the premises proves insufficient to pay the
indebtedness, he may have so much of the rents and profits in
the receiver's hands as is necessary to make good such defi-
ciency. We have already seen that the court must be con-
vinced that the mortgage security is inadequate, before it
will appoint a receiver at the request of the mortgagee.
Such inadequacy is composed of two elements, namely the insuf-
ficiency of the mortgaged premises per se as a fund for cancel-
ling the debt, and secondly, the fact of insolvency of the
mortgagor or other person primarily liable for the debt, or
of the fact of such persons being out of the jurisdiction of
the court.
Generally speaking the term "inadequacy of security"
includes both these elements, and the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of both of these ele-
ments, else he will not be entitled to a receiver. If only
one or the other of these elements is proved there will not
be sufficient ground for the receiver's appointment.
he inadequacy here mentioned means the inadequacy to dis-
charge the particular" mortgage of the plaintiff and not some
other and subsequent mortgage. But this rule may and does
include various other conditions in some of the states.1
(I) WarWick v. Hummell,52 N.J. Eq.427.
Hill v. Robertson, 24 Miss.368.
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In New York although statutes have changed the nature of
mortgages from a conditional sale to that of a lien, yet the
courts hold that these statutes do not affect the power of
the court to appoint a receiver pendente lite. And if the
mortgagor has allowed the taxes on the mortgaged property
to remain unpaid so that such premises are liable to sale for
the unpaid taxes, or if the mortgagor has covenanted to pay
taxes and keep the premises insured but fails to do so,
whereupon the mortgagee pays them, in such a case a receiver
may be appointed to save the property.
And as frequently happens when the mortgaged property is
so badly managed as to cause it to deteriorate in value,
or where such deterioration arises from natural causes alone,
a receiver will be appointed in these cases.
RECEIVERS IN JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S SUIT.
One of the most frequently invoked branches of the law
of receivers, is that in aid of judgment creditors, in order
that their judgments may be enforced after the usual legal
remedies have failed. In such cases the aid of equity is
necessary to protect the creditor.
The origin of this branch of the law of receivers was in
the old English Court of Chancery, it the main instrument in
developtng the law into its present state, has been the deci' -
sions of, the American courts.
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The basis or fundamental reason for granting this remedy
is beaause of the inadequacy of .a legal remedy, and the
consequent necessity of supplementing the legal remedy by the
aid of equity.
The fact of the Judgment crdditorzs inability to execute
his judgment at law, was sufficient to entitle him to a re-
ceiver over the debtor's estate.1  This principle may be
regarded as the foundation for the entire equity Jurisdiction,
concerning receivers in creditor's suits, and in all probabil-
ity underlies all the-decisions in this country on this ques-
tion. The courts of New York have had the greatest influence
on the growth of this branch of.the subject. Under the
former Chancery practice in this state *a receiver was ap-
pointed almost as a matter of course, to preserve the debtor's
property pending the litigation, after return of execution
unsatisfied.
If the judgment creditor filed a sworn bill, showing his
equitable right to all .the funds and property of the debtor,
and if the defendant debtor did not deny this right, no
reason existed for refusing the appointment of a receiver,
even if the defendant answered that he had no property to
protect.
And it was even considered to be the duty of the creditor,
within a reasonable time after filing his bill, and obtaining
an injunction to keep the debtor from interfering, to ask to
(1) Curling v.Townshend,19 Ves.628.
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have a receiver appointed to take charge of the debtor's
assets, in order to further secure the collection of the debt.
In New York under , the code this has been superseded
by appointing a receiver on proceedings "supplemental to exe-
cution". Under this proceeding the debtor may be compelled
to apply his concealed property, or such as might not be
levied upon by execution, to the paying of the judgment.
But the Judgment creditor must not be guilty of "laches"
in asserting his rights and must file his bill within a reasor
able time after the return of the execution unsatisfied, if
he would have a receiver appointed. The judgment creditor
must also fully and completely exhaust his legal remedies
for the collection of the judgment before equity will appoint
a receiver in his behalf. 1
It is not now considered sufficient ground for ap-
pointing a receiver, where the execution is returned nulla
bona before its "return day", because the court cannot know
until that day whether or not the legal remedy will be adequate
And since the legal remedy of execution may accomplish payment
the equity court will not interfere, until that remedy has
failed.
As to general creditors who have acquired no lien upon
the debtor's property, the weight of authority holds, that
"in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary,
a general contract creditor before Judgment, is not entitled
(1) Parker v.Moore, 3 Edw.Ch.234.
Starr v. Rathbone,l Barb. 70.
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either to an injunctionnor a receiver against his debtor, on
whose property he has acquired no lien".1  This is true even
in case of fraud on the part of the debtor.2
There is an apparent exception to this rule in New York,
in the case of an undisputed indebtedness due from a co-
partnership, which is insolvent. And if the plaintiff credit-
or pursues this remedy in behalf of all the creditors a re-
ceiver will be granted before his debt is reduced to a judg-
ment. And one more exception may here be noted, as where a
creditor has advanced money for the necessary repairs of a
vessel, or for necessary supplies and the master has in conse-
quence of the advance assigned all his interest and lien as
master, and all of the freight to the creditor. If such
creditor shows to the court, the insolvency of the owners of
the vessel, he will be granted a receiver and an injunction,
to protect this assigned lien, to collect freight due and to
apply the same on his debt.
Where a judgment debtor has fraudulently assigned his
property for the purpose of hindering and delaying his credit-
ors ; or where he assigns to a known insolvent assignee ;
or where the debtor retains possession of the property after
assignment,in all these cases a receiver will usually be ap-
pointed in behalf of the judgment creditor.
But the court while willing to aid Judgment creditors
will always proceed with extreme caution where the title to
(1) High on Receivers, sec. 406.
(2) Rich v.Levy, 16 Md.74.
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real estate claimed by and in the possession of third parties
is the subject-matter contested. "As against the legal title
the interposition is made with reluctance, and will only be
done in case of fraud clearly proved, and danger to the
property" l.
The character of property over which a receiver may be
appointed in behalf of judgment creditors, varies more or less
with the jurisdiction of the court. In Now Jersey a receiver
may be appointed to take charge of rings, jewelry and etc.,2
while in New York a receiver has been appointed over the notes
of an insolvent firm,3 so that it appears that a receiver
appointed in aid of a judgment creditor may be extended to
real or personal property or to property of almost any nature
whatsoever.
RECEIVERS OVER PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.
The power of a court of equity to appoint a receiver
over partnership property is not to be questioned, for it is
well settled that such power is fully vested in the court.
The purpose of appointing receivers in actions between
partners, is to have an accounting and settlement of the
partnership affairs, also to collect the debts, hold the
(1) Vause v. Woods, 46 Miss. 128.
(2) Frazier v.Barnum, 4 C.E.Green 316.
(3) Webb v. Overman, 6 Abb. Pr. 92.
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assets, in short to close up and bring to an end the business
of the partnership.
When a receiver is asked for in such a case, the court
is confronted with an exceedingly difficult problem, and
has a very delicate duty to perform. If it grants a receivei
on the one hand it puts an end to the partnership which one
of the partners claims a right to have continued ; while on
the other hand, if the court refuses a receiver, the defendant
is at liberty to go on with the partnership business, at the
risk and perhaps to the prejudice or loss of the partner .
praying for a receiver.
But sometimes it so happens that one thing or the other
must be done, consequently the court has determined that
certain circumstances will be sufficient ground for it to
proceed one way while certain other circumstances will cause
it to proceed differently. Under the English doctrine to
entitle one to a receiver, the suit must be so framed that
at the hearing a decree could be made, directing that the
partnership be completely dissolved-; or that the business
was carried on in violation of some instrument agreed upon
by the parties as to the manner of carrying on the business.
In this country, however, the essential and controlling
element necessary to the appointment of a receiver, is the
probability of a decree for dissolution. The circumstances
most readily allowing of the appointment of a receiver over
partnerships may be divided into four classes, namely,
16
First, where the partner applying for dissolution is
barred by the- other partner or partners from participating
in the profits, or in the management of the firm.
Second, in the case of any material violation of the
partnership contract.
Third, in case of fraud.
Fourth, in the case of dissolution by death where the
property is being mismanaged by the survivors.
But aside from these four general heads a partnership a-
greement, like any other lawful contract, is binding upon the
parties and they must adhere to its terms. No partner may
recede from such a contract without sufficient grounds for so
doing.I  The mere dissatisfaction of one partner is not
sufficient ground for dissolution ; nor is the rniere unprofit-
ableness of the business if none of the elements under the
four general heads above mentioned are present.
And a receiver will not be granted in any case unless an
actual partnership inter se existed between the parties.
The burden of proving such partnership is upon the plaintiff,
where its existence is denied by the defendant. And if the
agreement states that they- are not partners though-a firm name
is used, a receiver will not be appointed.
A general test for determining the existence of a part-
nership is, whether or not there is a right to participate
in the profits. If the plaintiff establishes such a right,
(I) Henn v.. Walsh, 2 Edw. Ch. 129.
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the receiver will usually be granted. But if the plaintiff's
interest is comparatively small ; or if the defendant gives
ample security to insure payment to the plaintiff of such
sum as may be found to be due to him at the final settlement;
or if the appointment of a receiver would greatly impair the
business,,no receiver will be appointed in these cases.
"As it is not the province of the court to create a
co-partnership, so it is equally foreign from its functions
to conduct its business."1  The function of the court is
only to wind up the business of the firm when the partners
cannot properly do so themselves. Yet though this principle
is true in most cases, the court may sometimes when actually
necessary direct or carry on the business through its receiver
or some one appointed by him. The court will never presume
to carry on or have the continUed management of any partner-
ship business, even through its receiver.
But if it is necessary to preserve the "good will" of the
business the loss of which wbuld cause great injury to a pur-
chaser, the court will, through its receiver, manage the
business pending legal proceedings for dissolution.2  When
dissolution of a partnership would result disastrously to
the interests of the parties, or where the defendant partner
strenuously objects to the appointment of a receiver, the
courts are extremely reluctant to act and usually will not act
at all, unless the case clearly falls within the principles
(1) Allen v.Hawley,6 Fla.164.
(2) Jackson v. DeForest, 14 How. Pr. 81.
18
laid down by the authorities.
In addition to the four general classes above mentioned
as sufficient grounds for the appointment of a receiver, is
the fact of an irreconcilable disagreement between the part-
ners which will cause great injury to their interests. In
the consideration of the conduct of one partner as to whether
or not it is such as will entitle the other to dissolution,
the duties and obligations implied in every contract of part-
nership, as well as the specific terms of thepartic u!4r
partnership must be taken into account and weighed. And where
the conduct of the defendant is entirely inconsistent with
that of a partner, and such that the plaintiff should be
entitled to dissolution, a receiver will usually be appoint-
ed.
Unless the court is quite positive that dissolution
will soon occur it will not interfere, as it is unusual for
it to assume the responsibility of continuing or managing the
business. Ocassionally a receiver may be appointed over a
partnership even though dissolution is not sought nor justifi-
able, as. where the parties have deviated greatly from their
agreement as to how the business should be conducted.
1
While a receiver may be granted as a part of a final de-.
cree, he is usually appointed upon an interlocutory applica-
tion on filing a bill for a dissolution and an accounting.
(1) Const.v.Harris, Turn., & R., 496.
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RECEIVERS OF RAILWAYS.
The jurisdiction of equity in appointing receivers of
railways has been in recent years greatly enlarged and extend-
ed by various statutes, which are based-upon and governed by
substantially the same principles as those which govern the
jurisdiction of the court in the appointment of receivers in
foreclosure proceedings against natural persons, or in behalf
of judgment creditors, or in cases of the dissolution of a
partnership. But the courts are much more reluctant to ex-
ercise this power over railways, than over the other cases
just mentloned.
The reason for such reluctance on the part of the court
seems to be on account of the quasi public nature of a railway,
also because of the peculiar nature of its franchises and
property and the great importance of a railroad corporation.
Whenever any of the ordinary remedies of the law side
of the court are available to the railway creditor for the
enforcement of his claim, the court will refuse to appoint
a receiver, if the company is well managed, receiving large
earnings and the creditor's judgment is comparatively small,
unless it is clear to the court that justice can be done in
no other way, and that a receiver is an absolute necessity.
A prayer for the appointment of a receiver pendente lite
over a railway can only be made incidentally by a party who
20
is plaintiff to an existing action. The receiver is here ap-
pointed for the purpose of preserving and protecting the prop-
erty for the benefit of all those interested, until such time
as the court can determine who is properly entitled to a
judgment.
But there is one notable instance, and seems to be only
one, that of the well-known "Wabash Cases",1 where receivers
were appointed over this railway, upo its own ,aplication.
This corporation was a consolidation of a number of existing
railway companies that were created by several states. The
company applied to the court for the appointment of receiver4
alleging insolvency and declaring that if its property was at-
tached by its numerous creditors, or broken into fragments by
being placed into the hands of various receivers, irreparable
injury would result to all who were interested and the court
granted the receiver asked for.
This seems to have been a very unusual and unprecedented
proceeding throughout, and it is to be hoped that it will not
become a precedent for other cases. An individual when he
finds insolvency threatening him, is not allowed to fly to
a court of equity and ask the court to protect him and keep
(1) Wabash,St.L. & P.Ry. Co~v. Cent.Trust Co.22Fed.Rep.272.
Ibid, 23 Fed.Rep.513.
Ibid, 23 Fed. Rep. 863.
Ibid, 29 Fed. Rep. 181.
Ibid, 29 Fed.Rep.618.
Little Warrior Coal Co. v. Hooper,17 So. 118.
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off his honest creditors. It would not be common justice
for the court to do so. And a railroad should not be allow-
ed to ask the court for such protection, any more than an
individual is allowed to do so. It would at once open a
wide door to fraud and gross injustice to creditors.
Receivers will, however, be appointed on a bill by a
share holder to set aside an unauthorized lease. Also to
protect a vendor's lien in case of the insolvency of the com-
pany ; or where several railroad corporations have had an
easement of the same tunnel at the same time, and a conflict
arises as to the easement between any two or more of the
companies, if the rights of the parties cannot be protected
in any other way, a receiver will be appointed to care for
them. And many other instances out of the ordinary course
might be mentioned where receivers will be appointed.
Sometimes two receivers have been appointed over the
same railway concurrently, but this is deemed to be a bad
practice, a single receiver being preferable on account of
harmonious action and economy.
Unlike the appointment of a receiver over a partnership,
the appointment of a receiver over a railway does not operate
as a dissolution of the railroad corporation. "Notwithstand-
ing the appointment of a receiver" says Mr . Justice Scott,1
"the corporation is clothed with its franchises and such cor-
poration still exists. The effect of the appointment of the
(1) Ohio & Miss.R.R.Co. v.Russell,115 111.52.
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receiver is simply to give him the temporary management of the
railroad under the direction of the courtinstead of the
manager appointed by the directors of the corporation. It
is that and nothing more. As the corporation still exists
it may exercise as before, its franchises, so that it does
not interfere with the rightful management of the road by the
receiver, so far as his duties are defined by the court ap-
pointing him. No doubt it may do many corporate acts, and
certainly it can do all things necessary to preserve its
legal existence notwithstanding the appointment of, the re-
ceiver to whom the temporary management of the road is given--
otherwise the appointment of the receiver would be tantamount
to a dissolution of the corporation."
-.Receivers are appointed over railway corporations for
the protection of bond holders and mortgagees, whose securi-
ties are a lien upon the road, when the corporation has fail-
ed to pay the principal or interest thus secured. This is
the most frequent ground for the appointment of receivers
over railways. In actions for the foreclosure of railroad
mortgages where a receiver is applied for, the courts are
governed by the usual principles which govern them in
appointing receivers over partnerships, for judgment creditor;
or in foreclosure proceedings against natural persons.
Here, as in those cases, proof of the inadequacy of
security and insolvency of the mortgagor is sufficient ground
for the appointment of a receiver.
23
The courts do not appoint receivers, as a matter of
course. The power of appointing rests in the sound Judi-
cial discretion of the court and depends on the rights, and
facts of the case as they are made to appear before the court.-
Where the court-thinks the appointment of a receiver is the
proper measure, it will not hesitate to appoint one, even
though the proceedings of the corporation issuing the bonds
and mortgages is impeached by negative testimony,,such as an
affidavit of the secretary setting forth his inability to
find a record of the authority for issuing the bonds and
mortgage.1  At the preliminary hearing the court refuses
to pass upon the validity of the bonds. But if the court
is of the opinion that by the appointment of a receiver,
all parties would be subject to greater injury than by al-
lowing the road to be operated by the company itself during
the foreclosure proceedings, then no receiver will be ap-
pointed.
The order of appointment given by the court prescribes
all the functions and duties of the receiver appointed there-
in. These duties and functions may be either enlarged or
diminished by the further and future orders of the court.
The receiver must comply with these directions, and acts
outside of them at his peril.
The main duties of a railway receiver pedet lite,
are the operation and management of the road, the payment of
(1) Keep v.Mich.& Lake Shore R.R.Co.,U.S.Ctrcuit Ct.
W. Dist.Mich. 6 Chicago Legal News, 101.
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current expenses and the application of the residue of the
earnings to the extinguishment of the debt. Inasmuch as
the primary object in appointing a receiver is for the pur-
pose of having him take charge of, hold and control the proper-
ty in a manner most beneficial to the mortgagees, bond hold-
ers and creditors generally, it is very seldom that the
court will authorize the receiver to extend the line of the
road except where such action is necessary to successfully
maintain and operate the road, or in order to prevent the
forfeiture of valuable land grants or franchises.
1
When such extension or enlargement of operation is per-
mitted by the court, the receiver will also be authorized to
issue certificates to meet the expenses necessarily incurred,
and such certificates will be a first lien upon the road,
even ahead of a first mortgage. This feature of railway
receivership is a most exceptional one, and cannot be said
to be found developed to such an extent if at all, in any
other class of receivership.
In order to be binding all contracts, such as those
Just mentioned, made by a receiver, must be sanctioned by
the court. If this is not done all persons contracting with
the receiver do so at the risk of such contracts being dis-
approved by the court. 2  But since a receiver pendente lite
of a railway, has very different and far more responsible du-
ties thrust upon him, than has a passive receiver, the former
(1) Kennedy v.St.Paul & Pacific R.R. ,2 Dillion 448.
(2) Lehigh C. & N. Co. v.Central R.R., 35 N.J. Eq. 426.
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is * allowed a wider discretionin making expenditures necessary
to operate the road, and all outlays made in good faith by
him in the ordinary course of business, promoting the inter-
ests of the corporation will be sustained and authorized by
the court. Some expenditures of this kind which the court
will authorize, are the keeping of the road, of its buildings
and rolling stock in repair ; also charges for drayage and
wharfage ; for office room and general advertising.
Some of the most perplexing questions arising in railway
receiverships are those concerning the indebtedness incurred
in managing and operating the railway and further those
concerning the extent to which certain classes of pre-existing
debts may be preferred in payment, out of either the income
of the receivership or the proceeds of foreclosure, as against
the mortgage bond-holders and other creditors.
While it may not be wholly in accord with sound legal
reasoning, yet the fact remains that through a court of equity
mere contract debts of a railway company unsecured by any lien
and incurred before the appointment of the receiver, may be
given priority over antecedent mortgages. But debts allowed
this peculiar privilege are usually only those made from
actual necessity in running the road, such as those incurred
for labor, material-men, supplies and equipment.
Such practice has been said to impair the obligation
of the mortgage contract, but it is so strongly upheld by
authority that it can no longer be questioned. And it may be
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defended upon the ground, that the mortgagee impliedly con-
tracts to allowing the payment of all necessary and actual
running expenses before the payment of his own claim. And
this because of the extra personal benefit derived by keeping
the road in operation. This is sometimes known as the doc-
trine of"diversion of the income". It is only doing in ef-
fect through the receiver what the corporation should have
done, and is therefore justifiable. For it is surely no more
than just that the corporation should pay its necessary run-
ning expenses before declaring any dividends whatever.
The leading case on this question is that of Fosdick v.
Schall,1  In that case Waite, C.J. says : "the income out of
which the mortgagee is to be paid, is the net income obtain-
ed by deducting from the gross earnings, what is required for
necessary operating expenses, proper equipment and useful
improvements. Every railroad mortgagee in accepting his
security, impliedly agrees that the current debts made in the
ordinary course of business, shall be paid from the current
receipts before he has any claim upon the income".
But here the question arises which is this, within what
time before the appointment of the receiver must such current
debts have been incurred, in order that the receiver pendente
lite, may be authorized to pay them before the claims of the
bond-holder and mortgagee are paid ? It may be said in a
general way, that these debts must have been incurred within
(1)Fosdick v.Schall, 99 U.S. 235.
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the length of time, prior to the appointment of the receiver,
equal to the usual time of credit given for the particular
articles. For instance, in a case of the sale of coal to
the railroad company,for its consumption, with three months'
credit. Here the receiver may pay for such coal if it was
purchased during the three months immediately preceding his
appointment. Different lengths of credit being allowed for
different articles would necessarily vary this rule. It
is more desirable, however, to have it uniform, therefore
some jurisdictionsl have claimed that no debts incurred
prior to six months before the appointment of the receiver
shall be paid by him. This has been termed the "six months'
rule", but it has not been generally adopted and claims have
in some instances been allowed, though they were incurred
within a much longer period than six months before the ap-
pointment of the receiver.
It may be questioned whether under this rule, the unpaid
salary of the president of the road shall be paid by the re-
ceiver, before paying the claim of the bond-holders and
mortgagee. There is some difference of opinion on this mat-
ter, but the solution of the question would seem to depend on
whether or not the president is deemed to be an actual neces-
sity in running the road.
Concerning the indebtedness incurred by the receiver
pendente lite, in operating the road, there seems to be little
(1) Blair v.St.L.,H.& K.R.R.Co.,22 Fed.Rep.271.
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or no question, as to the power of the court to authorize the
reeeiver to incur all actual and necessary running expenses.
The bond-holders should agree to such expenditures ; and
they should be reasonable and of such a character as to
prove beneficial to the corporation. But the receiver must
not pay these expenses out of the corpus of the property un-
less he is speciall authorized so to do by the court.
Receivers pendente lite may be held liable in their
official capacity for personal injuries received during their
management, in such cases as those in which the corporation
would have been held liable if it had been in control of
the read. But leave of the court must !-first be obtained
in order to recover for personal injury caused by negligent
management of the road. All such claims should be filed with
the receiver. By virtue of a United States statute a re-
ceiver may be sued in the United States Court appointing him,
without the consent of the court. Receivers are generally
held to a common carrier liability.
In New York a rather peculiar state of affairs exists as
to ability to sue receivers of railways. The courts of this
state have held that where the receiver has used reasonable
care in the selection of his employees, the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply, and therefore the receiver
is not liable for personal injuries inflicted. 1  The same
court has also held, that while the road was in the hands of
(1) Cardot v.Barney, 63 N.Y. ,281.
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1an
a receiver, the company was not liable for such injury,1and
so one is puzzled to know whether or not he can recover for
personal injuries, while the road is in the hands of the
receiver. The only method would seem to be to file claims
against boththe receiver and the road.
The court has in some instances compelled the road to
assume the liability for injuries inflicted during the
management of the receiver, as a condition of turning the
road over to the company again. But this seems to be an
exceedingly harsh rule, and one which cannot be justly en-
forced.
The New York doctrine above laid down is not the general-
ly accepted doctrine, however, and ordinarily the railroad
corporation is not to be held liable for injuries caused by
the negligence of the receiver's employees.2  But statutes
in the various states may cause the liability for personal
injury to be placed either upon the receiver or the corporation
In the English and American courts receivers were origin-
ally appointed for the purpose of closing up the business, or
of holding the property until the rights of contesting parties
could be determined finally by the court. Receivers were
not supposed to carry on the business and improve it, nor
were they supposed to contract any debts in behalf of the
property which they held, until Judgment was given in favor
of either one party or the other.
(1) Metz v.B.,C.& P.R.R.Co.,58 N.Y. 61.
(2) Ohio & Miss.Ry.Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind.553.
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The receiver of a farm in foreclosure proceedings was
not allowed to purchase seed, or work the farm thereby
causing expenditures to be made, until judgment was cendered.
Receivers of partnership were followed by dissolution of
the firm, and no expenditures were allowed unless there was a
contemplated sale of the business and some expenditures were
absolutely necessary to preserve the business and its good wiIL
for the benefit of the purchaser. Here it was necessary
to carry on the business to preserve its value, and in order
to carry it on debts were necessarily incurred. But such
action on the part of the receiver was always more or less
restricted. And in other cases as creditor's suits no re-
ceiver would be appointed upon the application of a creditor
until his claim had been reduced to the form of a judgment
or decree which gave him a lien upon the debtor's property.
Now consider the case of a receivership in a railway mort
gage foreclosure. A railroad mortgage covers all the profits
and franchiseswhich is an exceptional feature not found
in the case of other mortgages. Here the road is put up
for sale, but purchasers for a railroad are not allzlays to
be readily found, and since the court will not allow a per-
emptory sale, a receiver is appointed to manage it for and
in compliance with the orders of the court. Theoretically
the receiver should act only for a definite period, but
practically he acts indefinitely.
In foreclosure proceedings of a railroad mortgage,re-
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ceivers have come to be appointed as a matter of course.
This is so because of the quasi public nature of the rail-
road, and also for the obvious reasons that if the road is
not operated continuously, the property will greatly deteri-
orate in value. And furthermore railroads usually have
government contracts for carrying the mail which must be
done regularly and without interruption. Therefore on
account of these and other similar reasons, a receiver
pendente lite of a railway must necessarily be given a great-
er freedom of action and allowed to do certain things which
other receivers would not be permitted to do.
The exceptional features of a railroad receivership
seem to be :"--
First, a tendency of the railroad to ask for a receiver.
But this has only been granted in one case, which will proba-
bly be the last one.
Second, that the court takes charge of the property,
operates and continues the business through its receiver.
But this cannot be strictly called an exceptional feature,
for a court will under certain circumstances allow a re-
ceiver to continue a partnership or other business.
Third, the appointment of a receiver of a railway does
not work a dissolution of that corporation as it does in the
case of a partnership. This may be said to be a really ex-
ceptional feature of railway receivership .
Fourth,' the issuing of receiver's certificates to ema-
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ployees and material-men, for labor, equipment and supplies,
which certificates are a first lien upon the property even
ahead of a first mortgage.
Compare with this the rights of general creditors who
have acquired no lien upon the property, in creditor's suits.
And in railroad receiverships such certificates may be is-
sued for antecedent debts, under the so-called "six month's
rule". It has been said that this is allowed-in order to
prevent strikes and keep the men at work so that the road
may continue to operate, but this seems to be carrying the
doctrine a trifle too far. This last feature of paying
antecedent debts ahead of the claims of the bond-holder and
mortgagee may be said to be a really exceptional feature of
a railway receivership at present, but there is a tendency
to extend the same to the receivers of water and gas compan-
ies, on account of their beneficial and public nature, so
that it may not be long before this feature must cease to
be called an exceptional one in railroad receiverships.
But notwithstanding all these facts, it is obvious that
railroad receivers are less restricted, and have a much
broader and more extended field of action at the present time
than is allowed to any other class of receivers.
I
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